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What distinguishes the cognition of biologically modern humans from that of more archaic populations such as Neandertals?
The norm in paleoanthropology has been to emphasize the role of language and symbolism. But the modern mind is more
than just an archaic mind enhanced by symbol use. It also possesses an important problem solving and planning component.
In cognitive neuroscience these advanced planning abilities have been extensively investigated through a formal model known
as working memory. The working memory model is now well-enough established to provide a powerful lens through which
paleoanthropologists can view the fossil and archaeological records. The challenge is methodological. The following essay reviews
thecontroversialhypothesisthatarecentenhancement ofworkingmemorycapacitywastheﬁnalpieceintheevolutionofmodern
cognition.
1.Introduction
Ever since the publication of The Human Revolution twenty
years ago [1], many of the most exciting and contentious
debates in paleoanthropology have revolved around the
evolution of modern humans. The research and discussion
have focused on two intertwined goals: (1) understanding
the evolutionary transition from archaic to modern anatomy
and behavior, and (2) tracing the speciﬁc evolutionary
scenario by which the transition took place. In pursuing
the ﬁrst goal, paleoanthropologists strive to identify the
derived characteristics that distinguish modern anatomy
and behavior from those of more archaic humans, and
propose selective hypotheses to account for them. This goal
is in keeping with overall desire of paleoanthropologists to
understandtheentiresweepofhumanevolution.Thesecond
goalisthemorediﬃcult,andcertainlythemorecontentious.
Many paleoanthropologists would like to trace the actual
sequence of events that led to modernity: who made the
transition? Where did it happen? When did it happen? And,
perhaps most contentious of all, what happened to archaic
populations such as Neandertals? Archaeologists have been
intimately involved in the pursuit of both goals. They have
tried to identify derived features of modern behavior, as
preserved in the archaeological record, and have proposed
hypothesestoaccountfortheemergenceofmodernbehavior
[2–5]. But they have also attempted to trace the speciﬁc
evolutionaryscenariothroughuseofthesamearchaeological
remains [6–9]. As with the fossil remains, the second goal
has focused primarily on the fate of a single population from
southernoreasternAfrica,andtheconsequencesthatensued
for archaic groups, especially Neandertals.
Our interest is primarily in goal #1. In particular, we
are interested in documenting the emergence of modern
cognition, relying as much as possible on macroevolu-
tionary evidence supplied by archaeology. Until recently,
archaeological treatments of the cognitive components of
modernity have been dominated by variously developed
assertions concerning language and symbolic culture. This
focus on symbolism resulted from two quirks in the
history of palaeolithic archaeology. The ﬁrst is an accident
of archaeological discovery. The ﬁrst palaeolithic culture
attributed to early modern humans was the European Upper
Palaeolithic (ca. 40,000–14,000 years ago), and the most2 International Journal of Evolutionary Biology
spectacular component of it was its art—cave paintings,
ﬁgurines, and personal ornaments. The Neandertals who
preceded the Upper Palaeolithic in Europe had little or
none of this, and the contrast was stark. The presence of
art implied the presence of meaning, and modern symbolic
sensibilities, or so the reasoning went. Thus, in Europe
modern anatomy (Cro-Magnon) and modern symbolism
came to be linked, a scenario that was then applied with
littlecriticismtoothercontinents.Thesecondquirkislinked
to the history of archaeological method and theory. In the
1970s, palaeolithic archaeologists began to take social science
seriously as a source of interpretive models. At that time
social science had a strong structuralist orientation, and
Chomsky’s hypotheses about language were paramount. As
a result, many archaeologists came to consider language to
be the sine qua non of humanness. Indeed, this opinion
was so generally held that few ventured to question its
appropriateness when the “modern question” came to
dominate the attention of paleoanthropology in the 1990s.
Several inﬂuential summaries attributed modern behavior to
the emergence of modern language, on the assumption that
enhanced communication ability would have had obvious
evolutionary advantages [1, 5]. A few archaeologists took
a more critical stance. Davidson and Noble, for example,
carefully parsed language into its grammatical and symbolic
components, and, based on the work of Wittgenstein and
James Gibson, argued that true symbolism was a late
emerging faculty [10, 11].
Symbolism and language are certainly components of
modern thinking, and documenting their evolution is
important. However, alone they are insuﬃcient to account
for all of the features of the modern mind. The modern
mind is not, we contend, simply an archaic mind aug-
mented by symbolism and language. There are arguably
several other components, including problem solving and
long range planning abilities. A few archaeologists have
appreciated this—most notably Mithen [12], Ambrose [13],
andDavidsonandNoble[14].Thelatter,forexample,argued
that the colonization of Australia required planning abilities
only possible via modern language—so we are not alone
in this contention. Our approach diﬀers from theirs in its
theoretical and methodological bases. For the last decade,
we have taken a speciﬁc cognitive model, that of executive
functions and working memory, and used it to interpret
archaeological remains. The result has been a diﬀerent
and controversial picture of the emergence of one of the
components of modern thinking [15–18].
2. ExecutiveFunctions and WorkingMemory
As the label implies, executive functions encompass the
brain’s ability to plan and strategize. The term and concept
were ﬁrst developed by neuropsychologists working with
brain damaged adults, initially Russo-Japanese War soldiers
with head wounds. Neuropsychologists such as Luria [19]
described patients with damage to the frontal lobes who
retained full language faculties but who were unable to carry
out complex, purposive, goal-directed actions. They were
unable to evaluate the success or failure of their own actions,
and unable to alter their future behavior. Neural activity
centered in the frontal lobes was clearly very important for
higher level thinking. Executive functions of the frontal lobes
were:
“...at the heart of all socially useful, per-
sonally enhancing, constructive, and creative
abilities.... Impairment or loss of these func-
tions compromises a person’s capacity to main-
tain an independent, constructively self-serving,
and socially productive life no matter how well
he can see, hear, walk and talk, and perform
tests” [20], p. 281.
By the 1960s executive functions had become a well-
established cognitive array in the ﬁeld of neuropsychology,
and neuropsychologists had devised a number of assessment
tools that could be used to evaluate brain damaged individ-
uals (e.g., the Tower of London test). Adults with executive
function (EF) deﬁcits have a diﬃcult time functioning on
their own and often have poor social interaction skills (e.g.,
interacting with sales people to purchase an item). The
signiﬁcant role of EFs in social life led Barkley [21]t os u g g e s t
that the evolution of EFs occurred via selection for eﬀective
social cognition.
Coolidge and Wynn [15] initially proposed that EFs,
as deﬁned primarily by neuropsychologists, were a better
candidate than language for the neural development that led
to modern thinking. It soon became clear to them, however,
that a well-developed model in cognitive psychology encom-
passed many of the same cognitive phenomena as EFs, but
had the advantage of being more explicit in terms of speciﬁc
abilities, and also being based on experimental research with
normal, that is, not brain-damaged, individuals. This model
is working memory.
3. The Working Memory Model
The concept of working memory (WM) was ﬁrst developed
by Baddeley and Hitch in 1974 [22] as an elaboration of
the older concept of short-term memory. At its most basic,
WM is the mind’s ability to hold in attention, and process,
task-relevant information in the face of interference. As an
example we ask the reader to perform the following task:
as you read this paragraph, remember the ﬁnal word in
each of the sentences and after completing the paragraph,
recite these terminal words in order, from memory. This is a
test of working memory capacity. The more words you can
remember, the greater your WM capacity. Note that there
are two components to this task. First, you must remember
a sequence of words. This is a classic short-term memory
test, and in itself is not too taxing. But in this context you
must do it while reading, which interferes with remembering
the words. The WM model has been perhaps the single
most researched and successful cognitive model of the last
forty years. It has integrated and synthesized research results
from several allied ﬁelds such as psychology, neurology,
and neuropsychology. Even more important, psychometric
measures of WM capacity correlate with a wide variety of
critical cognitive abilities, including reading comprehension,International Journal of Evolutionary Biology 3
vocabulary learning, language comprehension, language
acquisition, second language learning, spelling, story telling,
ﬂuid intelligence, and general intelligence (e.g., [16]). The
correlation with ﬂuid intelligence is especially important
because ﬂuid intelligence is one’s ability to solve novel
problems. It is less inﬂuenced by learning and culture than
general intelligence (IQ) and tied directly to one’s problem
solving ability. Interestingly, WM has even more recently
been referred to as the new intelligence [23]. Thus, the WM
model is a natural heuristic for enquiring into the evolution
of modern thinking.
As currently understood, WM is not a single, simple,
neural system but a set of interlinked abilities. The current
WM model, as set out by Baddeley [24], consists of an
attentional pan modal processor (the “central executive”),
two subsystems (the “phonological loop” and the “visu-
ospatial sketchpad”), and a temporary memory store (the
“episodic buﬀer”). The phonological loop is dedicated to
auditory phenomena, and maintains and rehearses auditory
information either vocally or subvocally. The visuospatial
sketchpad is a distinct subsystem that processes visual
information (shapes and locations). The two subsystems
can operate simultaneously, so that, for example, one can
perform a visuospatial task and a speech task with minimal
interference.Theepisodicbuﬀerholdsinformationprovided
by the subsystems in active attention where it can be
processed by the resources of the central executive. The
central executive of WM performs most of the processing
including attention, active inhibition (or, e.g., suppress
distractingstimuliorprepotentresponses),decisionmaking,
planning, sequencing, temporal tagging, and the updating of
information in the two subsystems. It also serves as the chief
liaison to long-term memory and language comprehension.
The central executive takes control when novel tasks are
encountered, and one of its most important functions is to
override pre-existing habits and inhibit prepotent responses.
Neurologically, WM is primarily a network of the
prefrontal cortex (PFC) but also relies on extensive linkages
to parietal and temporal lobes and also connections to
subcortical regions. The dorsolateral PFC has long been
associated with executive functions, but there appears to
be no single neural structure that can be isolated. The
central executive, for example, appears to emerge from the
interplay of diverse cortical and subcortical systems (e.g.,
[25]). The phonological loop may be the most isolable
neural network of the system. Aboitiz et al. [26] have argued
that the phonological loop is a specialized auditory-vocal
sensorimotor circuit connecting posterior temporal areas
withtheinferiorparietallobeandtheventrolateralprefrontal
cortex. What is clear, however, is that WM is a complex
neural network consisting of neural pathways that interlink
much of the neocortex. As such, adult phenotypes are likely
to be the result of structural and regulatory genes governing
neural development, and also individual developmental
context.
Working memory is a trait that varies in modern pop-
ulations, and the variability correlates with performance on
several measures of intelligence, including language compre-
hension and planning. Much of this variability appears to be
under strong genetic control. Coolidge et al. [27], in an anal-
ysis of child and adolescent twins as rated by parents, found
that a core of executive functions including planning, orga-
nizing, and goal attainment, was highly heritable (77%) and
most likely due to an additive (polygenic) genetic inﬂuence.
In a study speciﬁcally focused on general WM functions,
Ando et al. [28] found a strong additive genetic inﬂuence
(43–49%). And on phonological storage capacity, Rijsdijk et
al.[29]founda61%additiveheritability.Friedmanetal.[30]
demonstratedthatexecutivefunctionsarecorrelatedbecause
they are controlled by a highly heritable (99%) common
factor that could not be explained by simple intelligence or
perceptual speed, and yet they can be separated because of
other genetic inﬂuences that may be unique to particular
executive functions. They concluded that the combination of
general and speciﬁc genetic inﬂuences makes the executive
functions among the most heritable psychological traits.
Today working memory is arguably the most researched
and well-understood model in cognitive neuroscience. As of
2007, more than 15,000 articles had been published contain-
ing the term “working memory” [31]. This much research is
boundtoengenderdisagreementsandcontroversybutisalso
likely to make signiﬁcant progress. The general features of
WM are now well delimited and understood; it is the details
that drive most research. As such it is a powerful model for
understanding the evolution of the modern mind.
4. Methodological Considerations
The challenge in cognitive archaeology is methodological.
The archaeological record itself is impoverished compared to
the experimental and ethological data sets of most cognitive
science. However, archaeological data are the residue of
activities that occurred in the past, and as such are the only
directevidenceofpastbehaviorandpastminds.Tappingthis
data reservoir requires carefully constructed arguments that
must be both cognitively valid and archeologically credible.
In practice, a valid cognitive archaeological argument must
have three components.
(1) The cognitive ability under investigation must be
well deﬁned by cognitive science. Common sense
categories such as “abstract” or “complex” are just
too vague to allow selection of valid attributes that
could be applied to archaeological remains. Unfortu-
nately, it is just such common-sense categories that
underpin most archaeological arguments for modern
cognition. It is noteworthy how rarely archaeologists
have taken the trouble to inform themselves about
cognitive science. Exceptions to this naivety include
the work of Mithen [12], who based his analysis
on concepts in developmental psychology, Davidson
and Noble [10, 14], who drew on Wittgenstein and
the ecological psychology of James Gibson, Ambrose
[32], who has used the McDaniel and Einstein’s
concept of prospective memory, and [33], who have
relied on neurosemiotic theory [33]. Archaeologists
must inform themselves about cognitive science if
they wish to make substantive contributions to
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The cognitive science literature is immense and
diverse, and much like evolutionary science, there are
many factions and schools of thought. One cannot
simply dip into it and pull out a useable model. One
must understand the intellectual context in which it
developed and in which it is used. The payoﬀ is well
worth this eﬀort—experimentally or ethologically
justiﬁed descriptions of cognitive abilities.
(2) The archaeologist must identify activities that would
require the cognitive ability under investigation.
This is the key methodological step. Unfortunately,
the cognitive literature itself rarely addresses the
kinds of activities that archaeologists can document.
Such activities tend to be messy (metaphorically
and actually) and diﬃcult to operationalize in the
laboratory. Some cognitive scientists do try to incor-
porate real world activities in their discussion, but
for the most part archaeologists must themselves
identify the appropriate activities, based either on
their own experimental protocols (see, e.g., [34]o r
[35]), or on their understanding of the cognitive
ability in question (see [36] for an example using
spatial cognition). It is here that the value of explicit
cognitivemodelsbecomesapparent.BecausetheWM
model identiﬁes response inhibition as an important
component of the central executive, we can ask the
tractable question “What activities require response
inhibition?”, and generate a list of activities that
would be visible archaeologically. A strict standard
of parsimony must apply; the activities must require
the cognitive ability. If an activity (say, specialized
mammal hunting) could be performed using a
less powerful form of cognition (e.g., procedural
memory), then the less powerful form must be given
precedence.
(3) The archaeologist must deﬁne attributes of the
activitiesthatwouldpreserveinarchaeologicalrecord
and which can reliably stand for the activity. This is
the essential archaeological piece to the argument,
and is a step required in any archaeologically based
reasoning. One of the major challenges in this step
is equiﬁnality. Often many activities can produce
identical or very similar archaeological residues (e.g.,
hunting versus high-end scavenging leave similar
butcherytraces).Againastrictstandardofparsimony
must apply; one must be conﬁdent of the link
between archaeological traces and the reconstructed
activity. For example, some (e.g., [37]) argue that
evidenceforNeandertalburialinMiddleEasternsites
is evidence for modern symbolic ability. However,
the evidence is more parsimoniously explained as
minimalcorpsetreatmentbyNeandertalswithstrong
emotional attachment, and grief at the loss of the
deceased.
Archaeological credibility is no diﬀerent for cognitive
archaeology than it is for any other archaeological inter-
pretation. The evidence must have been acquired by sound
ﬁeld and analytical techniques, and it must be reliably
situated in time and space. These requirements are easily
stated but not easily met. Indeed, one could argue that
the preponderance of time, energy, and resources in any
archaeological research is devoted to these practical issues.
But this does not in turn mean that archeological credibility
is more important than cognitive validity in the structure of
a cognitive interpretation. Both are equally necessary.
5. Archaeological Evidence for Modern
Working Memory Capacity
We have already set out our case for the ﬁrst component
of our archeological argument for the evolution of modern
cognition. Working memory is a well-deﬁned, voluminously
documented component of the modern mind. Moreover,
it is an ability that varies in modern people, and it is an
ability possessed by nonhuman primates at a comparatively
reduced capacity. Modern WM capacity must have evolved
over the course of human evolution. Hints at increasing
capacity (beyond an ape range) can be identiﬁed as far back
as Homo erectus [17]. But when did it achieve modern levels,
something we have labeled “enhanced working memory”
(EWM)?
The second step in the analysis is to identify activities
that require not just WM, but EWM. This presents two
related practical problems. First, WM capacity is typically
measured in terms of numbers of discrete items (e.g.,
terminal words in a series of read sentences). We cannot
apply such tests in prehistory, and thus a simple quantitative
measureisunavailable.Wemustrelyonbehavioralcorrelates
of WM capacity. Second, psychological tests of WM capacity
rarely include activities that would leave an archaeological
signature; it is necessary for the archaeologist to select the
appropriate activities. In practice this requires that we, as
researchers, make ordinal comparisons of everyday tasks.
Because these judgments are ordinal (e.g., more versus less),
they are by nature not ﬁne-grained. For example, we will
argue that planning months and years in advance is a feature
of modern executive thinking enabled by modern WM. It
is fairly easy to cite modern examples. But what would
constitutearchaicWM?Wecanarguethatprehistoricgroups
who did not demonstrate appropriate activities did not
have modern WM, but it is eﬀectively impossible to assign
a number. Moreover, there is always the danger of under
assessing WM if we rely on only a few kinds of activities. We
mustthereforeuseavarietyofdiﬀerentactivitiesifwewishto
have reasonable conﬁdence in our assessment. Below we will
identify technological activities, subsistence activities, and
information processing activities that we suggest are reliable
indicators of EWM.
Theﬁnalstepintheanalysisistoscourthearchaeological
record for the earliest credible evidence for the activity in
question. There are several inherent pitfalls in this step.
One, the problem of equiﬁnality, we have already touched
upon. A second is simple serendipity. Much of the evidence
we seek requires good preservation—a rarity in palaeolithic
sites—but we also need the good fortune to ﬁnd such sites.
Archaeologistshavelittlecontroloverthesefactors.However,
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is not evidence of absence.” Often absence of evidence is
evidence of absence. Nevertheless, it is always dangerous to
concludethatevidencefromonesitewillalwaysbetheoldest,
or to adhere to too strict a chronology. As a corollary, it is
important to use as many diﬀerent kinds of archaeological
evidence as possible. If the archaeological evidence for many
diﬀerent activities all point to the same chronological con-
clusion, then conﬁdence in the conclusion improves. Finally,
some archaeological evidence is direct—archeologists ﬁnd
physical remains of the activity. But some is indirect; the
archaeological remains strongly imply the presence of the
activity. For example, archaeologists have occasionally found
actual traps made of wood and ﬁber. As you might suppose,
these are very rare because the constituent materials rarely
s u r v i v et h er a v a g e so ft i m e .T h eo l d e s ts u c he x a m p l e sa r e
only about 8,000 years old. So, was the ﬁrst use of traps only
8,000 years old? Archaeologists think not, but the evidence is
indirect, primarily in the form of animals that could not be
eﬀectively killed or captured without the use of traps. This
indirect evidence pushes traps back to perhaps 70,000 years
ago [38] ,ac o n s i d e r a b l ed i ﬀerence.
6. Technical Evidencefor Enhanced
Working Memory
The irony for archaeologists is that technology is the most
visible activity in the archaeological record, but one of the
least likely to require the resources of EWM. Most tool
making and tool use relies, often exclusively, on a style of
thinking known as expertise or expert performance [39–41].
This kind of thinking relies on procedural cognition and
long-term memory—motor action patterns learned over
years of practice and/or apprenticeship. It is also largely
nonverbal. Very little of the problem solving ability of EWM
is ever devoted to tool use. Instead, ﬂexibility in tool use
comes from the large range of procedures and solutions
learned over years. The millions of stone tools produced over
human evolution tell us mostly about this other cognitive
system, not WM. It is not that WM was never used, just that
it is almost impossible to eliminate procedural cognition as a
candidateforthecognitionbehindthetooloruseinquestion
(e.g., equiﬁnality and parsimony). Nevertheless, there are
technicalsystemsthatdorequireEWM,andwhichcannotbe
reduced to procedural cognition. Most of the good examples
(e.g., alloyed metals and kiln ﬁred ceramics) appeared so
late in human evolution as to engender little controversy or
interest (ca. 6,000 years ago). There are just a few that extend
much further back.
6.1. Traps and Snares. “Facility” is a term for relatively
permanent immobile constructions built onto or into the
landscape [42]. Perhaps the most common facilities used by
hunters and gatherers are traps and snares, which are facili-
tiesdesignedtocaptureorkillanimals(includingﬁsh).Facil-
ities, including traps and snares, are often multicomponent
gadgets, occasionally very heavy, that are time-consuming
to build, and which operate remotely, occasionally in the
absence of direct human engagement. It is the remote action
that implicates EFs and EWM. To make a trap one must
project present action toward a future, uncertain result. This
requires the long range planning in space and time of mod-
ern EFs, and relies signiﬁcantly on the response inhibition of
the central executive of WM (delayed gratiﬁcation).
Direct archaeological evidence for traps and snares, as
mentioned above, have a relatively shallow antiquity. Actual
wooden ﬁsh traps date back 4,500 years in North America,
and a few thousand years earlier in Europe, that is, not much
earlier than the alloyed metals passed over above. The oldest
direct evidence of a kind of trap appears to be the “desert
kites” of the Middle East [43]. These are lines of piled stone
cairns, often hundreds of meters long, converging on a stone
enclosure. There were used to hunt gazelle, and the oldest are
about 12,000 years old.
Indirect evidence pushes traps and snares back to about
35,000 and perhaps even 75,000 years ago. At Niah cave on
Borneo, Barker et al. [44] have evidence of extensive remains
of bush pigs by about 35,000BP, an animal best hunted using
netsorsnares.Similarly,Wadley[38]hasrecentlyarguedthat
extensiveblueduikerremainsatSibuduareindirect evidence
for using traps by 70,000-year-old Middle Stone Age people
in South Africa. In sum, traps and snares supply direct
evidence for modern WM back to 12,000BP, and indirect
evidence back to 75,000BP.
6.2. Reliable Weapons. Twenty-ﬁve years ago, Peter Bleed
introduced a distinction in technical systems that has impor-
tantcognitiveimplications,thatbetween“maintainable”and
“reliable” weapons [45]. The former require comparatively
less eﬀort to produce but are easier to ﬁx (“maintain”) when
necessary, for example, when damaged through use. Most
stone tools, even from recent time periods, qualify as main-
tainable. Reliable weapons, on the other hand, are designed
to assure function, that is, to reduce as far as possible the
chances for failure. As such they tend to be over designed,
complexinthesenseofhavingseveralinterrelatedparts,hard
tomaintain,andoftenheavy.Theyoftenrequirelongperiods
of “down time” for their construction and maintenance, and
are most often intended to be deployed over short time
spans of heavy use. Bleed developed this distinction as a way
to understand the diﬀerence between simple stone tipped
thrusting spears and the sophisticated projectile systems
of North American Paleoindians, which included spear
throwers, ﬂexible aerodynamic shafts, replaceable foreshafts,
and thin, ﬂuted stone points. However, the distinction
between maintainable and reliable applies generally to all
technologies,notjustweapons.Theguidingprinciplebehind
reliable systems is that the investment of time and labor
well in advance of need will maximize future success.
More recently, Shea and Sisk [46] have taken a related
but narrower focus and argued that the use of complex
projectile weaponry (spear throwers and bows and arrows)
is a good marker of modern technical prowess. “We use
the term ‘complex projectile technology’ to refer to weapons
systems that use energy stored exosomatically to propel
relatively low mass projectiles at delivery speeds that are
high enough to allow their user to inﬂict a lethal puncture
wound on a target from a ‘safe’ distance” (p. 102). They
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derivedfeatureofmodernbehavior.Reliableweapons,andin
particular complex projectile weapons, rely on the executive
function ability to plan over long stretches of time, and
especially the response inhibition of WM (i.e., do not hunt
today, even if you are hungry, but instead invest your eﬀort
in producing tools more likely to succeed tomorrow), and
contingency planning (if the foreshaft breaks, slip in a new
one; it is quicker than making an entire spear).
The archaeological record in North America clearly
places reliable weapons back to Paleoindian times, at least
11,500BP (roughly the same age as the earliest desert
kites in the Near East, which were also reliable technical
systems). Earlier examples rest on our ability to judge time
investment and eﬀectiveness of technical systems. Following
Pike-Tay and Bricker [47], we believe that one earlier type
of Palaeolithic artifact qualiﬁes as being a component of
a reliable system, and certainly an element of complex
projectile technology—the bone and antler projectile points
(a.k.a. sagaies) of the European Upper Palaeolithic. To
make these artifacts, artisans used stone tools to remove
appropriately sized blanks from a piece of bone or antler,
often after soaking the raw material, and then carved the
blanks into speciﬁc shapes (split based, barbed, etc.). Most
were spear points hafted directly onto shafts, but others were
harpoon heads, designed to come oﬀ the shaft while attached
to a line. There are many examples of reworked points,
attesting to the time required to make one from scratch.
The most spectacular examples of such projectile points,
which include the harpoons, date from the Late Upper
Palaeolithic, about 14,000–18,000BP, with slightly simpler
systems extending back to 30,000 years ago. In Africa, bone
points date back even earlier, perhaps as early as 90,000 years
ago in the Congolese site of Katanda [46, 48]. The European
evidence is more compelling because of the contemporary
evidence for managed foraging (see below), and evidence for
spear throwers and harpoons, which imply systems of gear.
As yet the early African evidence consists of just the bone
points, but it is provocative nonetheless.
6.3. Hafting. Hafting—attaching a stone tool to a shaft—
has itself often been touted as a technological and even
cognitive watershed in human evolution [13, 32]. Hafted
tools represent the ﬁrst time Palaeolithic people united
separate elements into a single tool. These compound tools
consist of three distinct elements: the stone tool (usually a
spear point), the shaft, and the haft itself. It was the haft
that was the challenge because it had to withstand signiﬁcant
impact forces when the tool was used. Spears with hafted
stone points represent a clear escalation in the human-prey
arms race, and it is fair to emphasize their importance
in technological history. But their cognitive signiﬁcance is
harder to assess. Much hinges on how the hafting was done.
A simple haft using a naturally available glue has diﬀerent
implications than a haft requiring days of soaking animal
tendons followed by controlled, heated drying of the lashings
on the shaft. The former is straightforward, single-sitting
task, while the latter is a multiday procedure. In a sense, the
former leans towards maintainable, the latter toward reliable
in the maintainable-reliable continuum. It is only the latter
that carries clear implications for EWM capacity. Hafting
also calls out for a discussion of invention, the conscious
design of an innovative technology. Someone had to design
the ﬁrst haft; it could not have occurred by accident. And
it would be very informative, from a cognitive perspective,
to know just how that person came up with the idea. The
frustrating answer is that we just do not know. We can
speculate, but our speculations cannot then be used as data
for a cognitive interpretation.
The earliest evidence for hafting extends back probably
200,000yearsinEurope,theMiddleEast,andAfrica[49–52],
and includes examples by Neandertals and modern humans.
Thus far, at least, these early hafts seem to be of the simpler,
single-sitting task variety, though certainly collection of nat-
ural adhesives adds a component of complexity to the task,
and Gr¨ unberg [53]a n dK o l l e re ta l .[ 54] have argued that the
production of birch pitch required sophisticated knowledge
of heating temperatures. It was only after 100,000 years
ago that there is evidence for multiday hafting procedures.
The best evidence comes from Sibudu in S. Africa (the
same site as the indirect evidence hunting blue duikers with
snares) at about 70,000BP. Here hunters used a mixture of
acacia gum, a little beeswax, and powdered ochre to produce
an adhesive that had to be carefully dried using ﬁre [34].
Although in theory such hafting could be accomplished by
procedural cognition, the variety of constituents required
for the adhesives, and the multiday procedure itself, imply
the use of modern WM, particularly response inhibition and
contingency planning.
To summarize, three lines of technical evidence are
in broad agreement. Convincing archaeological evidence
extends easily back to 18,000 years BP or so, but there are
strong examples going back as far as 70,000 years BP in
Africa. Earlier than that there is only the single example of
simplehafts,whichcannotalonebeartheweightofassigning
modern WM. It is important to reiterate that technology is
not a domain of activity that easily documents WM capacity.
Procedural cognition can be eﬀective and ﬂexible, and can
encompass almost all technical activity. Certainly hafting, or
even complex projectile technology, could not alone stand
as evidence for modern executive thinking (nor, we should
emphasize, do [46] make such a claim). Of the examples we
cite, the only one that might stand alone as an argument for
moderncognitionistheexampleoftraps.Technicalevidence
works better when it supports or corroborates evidence from
other domains.
7. ForagingSystems
Next to technology the domain of activity most visible in the
archeological record is subsistence—acquiring and process-
ing food. And like technology, archaeologists’ arguments for
modern subsistence systems have been heavily distorted by
the record of the European Upper Palaeolithic, especially its
later phases, which included examples of specialized hunting
of single species such as reindeer or mammoth. These were
no doubt impressive subsistence systems but specialization
per se does not actually require the planning resources of
modernEFsandWM.ItcaneasilybeorganizedandexecutedInternational Journal of Evolutionary Biology 7
by expert procedural cognition. In fact this is arguably a
more appropriate cognitive strategy because it consists of
well-learned, automatic responses that can be selected and
deployed quickly in dangerous situations. Neandertals were
very good at this kind of thinking and, no surprise, we have
extensiveevidenceforspecializedhunting[55,56].Thus,itis
necessarytoeschewthis war-horseofmodernity andidentify
subsistence activities that actually do require modern EFs
and WM.
Modernpeoplemanagetheirfoodsupply.Thisisobvious
in agricultural economies, where activities must be planned
on a yearly scale (for nontropical systems). It clearly relies
on the long-range planning of EFs and, more speciﬁcally, the
response inhibition that is a key component of modern WM
(e.g., retaining a portion of the harvest for replanting even
in the presence of extreme want). But agriculture is not the
only form of managed foraging. Most of the hunting and
gathering systems archaeologists have recognized as “com-
plex” also qualify [57]. Good recent ethnographic examples
include foragers of the Northwest Coast of America, the
Arctic, and Australia. In Northern and Western Australia,
hunter-gatherers systematically burn tracts of land in order
to encourage a second green-up of grass, which attracts her-
bivores. They rotate the tract to be burned every year, and do
not return to a tract for at least a decade [58]. This is a man-
aged system, with planning over long periods, and response
inhibition. Another component of modern hunting and
gatheringsystemsisamarkeddivisionoflaborbyageandsex
[59]. It requires coordination of separate labor pools, which
weakly implicates WM and its executive functions (organi-
zation, delegation, disputation, etc.), but more importantly
is manifested in the tropics by increased reliance on small,
seasonal resources (plants and small animals) that require
scheduled harvesting, typically by women and children.
Archaeological evidence for agriculture extends back to
10,000 years BP on several continents, and evidence for
managed forms of hunting and gathering back another
several thousand years in the guise of Archaic, Mesolithic,
and Epipalaeolithic cultures all over the world. An especially
good example is that of the Epipalaeolithic site of Abu
Hureyra in Syria [43]. Here a group of hunters and gatherers
established a sedentary community based on hunting gazelle
and gathering a wide variety of local plants. When the
local conditions became much drier 11,000–10,000 years ago
these people did not simply shift the focus of their hunting
and gathering; they changed its very basis by beginning to
cultivate rye. The interesting point is not so much the broad
spectrum hunting and gathering but the inventive response
to changing conditions. These people were clearly using the
planning abilities enabled by EWM.
Finding evidence for managed foraging that is earlier
than the end of the Pleistocene is fraught with problems,
mostly linked to preservation, but also to mobility patterns
of earlier hunter-gatherers who rarely settled in permanent
s i t e sl i k eA b uH u r e y r a .T h ea m o u n to fr e f u s ei sm u c hl e s s ,
and harder to characterize. Nevertheless, there are several
provocative earlier examples. A well-known example is
that of late Upper Palaeolithic reindeer hunters [60]o f
southwestern Europe (ca. 18,000 years BP). Here it is not
the specialization that is telling (see above), but the evidence
for a tightly scheduled hunting system in which herds were
intercepted and slaughtered at speciﬁc locations during
migrations, but at other times of the year were hunted
individually using a diﬀerent set of tactics. Though other
resources were used, reindeer were the clear focus year-
round, using a seasonally adjusted strategy that included
periods of down-time during which the hunters made and
maintained their complex technical gear (see above). At
about the same time, hunters on the Russian Plain used a
system in which they killed large numbers of animals during
late summer/early fall and then cached large quantities of
meat in underground storage pits for freezing and future
consumption [61]. Storage and delayed consumption are
strong evidence for modern WM.
Earlier evidence is largely indirect. At Niah Cave on the
island of Borneo [44], archaeologists have recovered large
quantities of pollen from plants that ﬂourish on recently
burnedareas.Thelocaltropicalconditionsarequitewet,and
the pollen far exceeds what one would normally expect to
ﬁnd, suggesting extensive human-induced burning. This evi-
dencedatestosometimebetween42,000and28,000yearsBP.
Earlier still is the evidence for hunting blue duiker in South
Africa using snares or traps (70,000 years BP, see above).
Of similar antiquity is evidence from other South African
sites for extensive use of corms (ﬂeshy, semisubterranean
stems), which are features of plants that ﬂourish on burned
landscape, suggesting as at Niah human use of ﬁre as an
ecology altering tool [62]. Kuhn and Stiner [59] argue that
this broadening of the subsistence base in South Africa is
an indication of division of labor by age and sex. In sum,
the archaeological evidence for managed foraging parallels
the evidence of technology. There is a strong signature going
back 18,000 years or so, and a weaker, but still provocative,
set of isolated examples going back 70,000 years.
8. Information Processing
Thus far in our discussion we have focused primarily on the
long-range planning and response inhibition components of
modern EFs and EWM and have traced them archaeologi-
cally through the technological and subsistence records. We
now shift focus to problem solving, another of the executive
functions enhanced through an increase in WM capacity.
Working memory is the active problem solving “space” of
the modern mind. We use WM to construct analogies,
perform thought experiments, make contingency plans, and
even make metaphors. It is how and where we bring things
together in thought; however, even modern WM has a lim-
ited capacity, because the episodic buﬀer is a limited capacity
store. If the capacity of this store is depleted by holding raw
information, little comparison and processing can also occur
(try multiplying two four-digit numbers in your head). One
solution to the problem that modern humans regularly use is
externalization of some of this information, that is, holding
the information outside of the mind itself. This is an aspect
ofextendedcognition,whichhasrecentlyreceivedsigniﬁcant
attention in cognitive science [63], and even archaeology
[64, 65]. Our interest is on the implications that extended8 International Journal of Evolutionary Biology
Figure 1
cognition holds for WM, and the primary eﬀect is to extend
WM capacity by relieving the necessity to hold information
in the episodic buﬀer, thereby freeing capacity for the
processing components of the central executive. Examples
of such externalized storage systems abound in the modern
world—writing, numbers, calculators, and so on. External
systemsneednotbeartifactual—onecan,forexample,count
on one’s ﬁngers—but they often are artifactual, which gives
us an avenue to follow into the prehistoric past.
It is uncontroversial to assert that early writing and
accounting systems, which date back at least 5,000 years,
were external information storage. Systems of clay tokens,
used for accounting purposes, extend the record back several
thousand years into the early Neolithic [65, 66]. We pick up
the trail about 12,000 years ago at the site of Grotte du Tai in
western France [67].
The plaque in Figure 1 above appears to have been a
record keeping device. Someone engraved a series of long
lines crossed by groups of slashes on a piece of ﬂat bone.
Marshack, and later d’Errico [68], examined the markings
microscopically and determined that they were produced
by diﬀerent tools, probably in diﬀerent episodes. Marshack
famously argued that it was a lunar calendar, but d’Errico
concluded simply that it was an external memory device.
We do not know what the engraver was tracking, but it
was clearly something, attesting to a desire to externalize
information, thereby freeing up WM capacity for processing.
Similar objects, not quite as elaborate, date back in Europe
to about 28,000 years BP [2].
Earlier still, and equally provocative are therianthropic
ﬁgurines from Germany, the most famous of which is the
Hohlenstein-Stadel ﬁgurine (see Figure 2). This is an image
of lion-headed person (or human-bodied lion) carved in
elephant ivory, roughly 28cm high. It is about 32,000 years
old [69]. It is certainly an evocative piece, and has inspired
much discussion about symbolism and Upper Palaeolithic
religious thinking. It also has a number of important
implications for cognition [70], one of which concerns WM.
The ﬁgurine is an externalized abstraction. Such a creature
does not exist in the real world, and it must have been
metaphorically glued together, initially at least, in the WM of
some Upper Palaeolithic person. The problems people need
tosolvearenotalwayspracticalissuesinday-to-daylife.They
are also social, and even metaphysical. The Hohlenstein-
Stadel ﬁgurine is the externalization of such a metaphysical
problem, and its externalized presence frees up WM of the
artisan,andalsoobservers,toponderotherrelatedexistential
issues.
Figure 2
So far, our discussion of externalized information pro-
cessing has not yielded any surprises. Suggesting that Upper
Palaeolithic people in Europe 32,000 years ago exercised
modern cognition is neither a novel nor a controversial
conclusion.Butwhataboutearlier?Canwepushexternalized
information back as far as the early evidence of traps, or
managedforaging?Theanswerisyes,butitrequiresaslightly
diﬀerent take on a famous set of artifacts—the Blombos
beads.
Blombos Cave is a site on the coast of South Africa whose
Middle Stone Age levels date back at least 77,000 years. These
MSA levels have famously yielded engraved bones, shaped
and engraved pieces of ochre, bone awls, and marine shell
beads [3, 33, 71]. These are among the earliest putatively
modern artifacts yet found, and make a strong case for
extending many of the components of modern behavior and
cognitionbacktothisearlyperiod.Buttheinitialenthusiasm
has recently been tempered by more sober critiques. d’Errico
andHenshilwood[71],forexample,arguedthatthepresence
of decorative beads indicates that the inhabitants had fully
syntactical language. This conclusion was then elegantly
challenged by Botha [72], who pointed out that d’Errico
and Henshilwood had not made explicit and convincing
bridging arguments linking beads to language. Henshilwood
and Dubreuil [33] have replied, providing part of the linkage
(a very nice example of a productive scholarly exchange), but
the implications of the beads are still not entirely clear. We
suggest that an alternative approach is to look at these arti-
facts not in their possible symbolic role, but as externalized
information storage. Henshilwood and Botha agree that the
shells with punched holes were beads, and that the beads
were worn as ornaments. But why does one wear beads? One
answer is that one wears beads to send information about
oneself to another person. This could be an explicit message
about social status (“I am an adult”, “I am wealthy”, and so
on), or an implicit message (“I am a good mate prospect”),
but by changing how others view the wearer, the wearer isInternational Journal of Evolutionary Biology 9
externalizing information about him or herself. Curiously,
there is an alternative function for these beads that neither
Henshilwood nor Botha have considered. They might have
been tally devices, used to keep track of (remember) some
sequential phenomena (much like rosary beads). The social
implications of this option are diﬀerent from the decorative
bead interpretation, but the information implications are
similar:beadswereanexternalizedstoreofinformation,free-
ing WM to devote space in the episodic buﬀer for processing
information, rather than just holding it in attention.
This evidence of externalized information storage is
provocative. We live in a modern world where externalized
information has come to dominate, perhaps even over-
whelm, our daily lives, and the thought that it had its roots
farbackinthestoneageiscertainlyprovocative.However,for
our topic at hand—working memory—external storage of
information is actually an ambiguous signature. Externaliza-
tion of information would release storage space for episodic
buﬀers of whatever capacity, not just modern capacity. There
need only be enough capacity to hold the external device as
a token of some kind in the episodic buﬀer as one performs
processes upon it. Because of this ambiguity, we suggest that
evidence for the use of external storage devices cannot, on its
own, provide compelling evidence for modern WM. It can,
however, stand as corroborating evidence for assessments
established by other means. As such, it supports the picture
painted using technology and subsistence, that is, strong
evidence in this case going back to perhaps 30,000 years, and
weaker evidence extending further to 77,000 BP.
9. Conclusion and Discussion
At the outset of this essay we noted that archaeologists
who study the problem of modern human origins typically
address two rather diﬀerent subgoals—the emergence of
modern culture/cognition, and/or the speciﬁc evolutionary
scenario by which one or more archaic populations made
the transition to modernity. Our documentation of the ﬁnal
enhancementofworkingmemoryisprimarilyacontribution
to the ﬁrst of these subgoals. Evidence from neuroscience
clearly identiﬁes a planning and problem solving ability that
is isolable neurologically and behaviorally from symbolic
and language abilities. This component of modern thinking
is working memory. Archaeological evidence indicates that
human WM capacity underwent an enhancement to the
modern range in the relatively recent past. Given the
serendipitous nature of archaeological preservation and
recovery, assigning a precise date for this development is not
yet possible. Modern WM capacity was certainly in place by
30,000 years ago, but there is scattered evidence that it may
be as old as 77,000 years ago. Despite this range of dates, it is
clear that an enhancement of WM capacity was one of the
ﬁnal developments in human cognition that produced the
modern mind.
Perhaps not unexpectedly, most of the criticism of our
hypothesis has been aimed at its implications for the second
sub-goal pursued by archaeologists—the narrative scenario
ofjustwhobecamemodern[73,74].Weadmittofuelingthis
ﬁre by directly addressing the issue of Neandertal cognition
[41, 75, 76]. The archaeological signature of Neandertals
is well known, but does not provide evidence for the
enhancement of WM that can be found elsewhere. But
beyond this fairly direct contrast, the archaeological record
for EWM ﬁts several alternative scenarios for just who
become modern and when they did.
(1) Alleles for enhanced WM accompanied the parietal
hypertrophy that distinguishes the brains of Homo
sapiens sapiens from those of archaic Homo sapiens
such as Neandertals [77]. The parietal hypertrophy
is not itself evidence for an increase in WM capacity
becauseWMisprimarilyafrontallobefunction,with
signiﬁcant neural links to the parietal and temporal
lobes, and the basal ganglia. But clearly something
did evolve in the brains of Homo sapiens sapiens
by about 200,000 years ago [50], and perhaps WM
capacity accompanied this development. If true, it
leaves us with a chronological gap. Archaeological
evidence for enhanced WM does not appear until
at least 130,000 years later. There are two ways to
account for this lacuna.
(a) The alleles for enhanced WM at ﬁrst yielded
o n l yav e rym od e s tr e p r od u cti v ead v a n t a g e ,a n d
it was not until a signiﬁcant proportion of
the population (presumably African) expressed
the enhanced phenotype that group planning
and problem solving began to provide a more
marked advantage, which powered a subse-
quent rapid expansion after 70,000 years ago.
Wedonotknowwhetherornotsuchasequence
c o u l de v e nb em o d e l e di nm i c r o e v o l u t i o n a r y
terms, and at this point it remains conjecture.
(b) The alleles for enhanced WM yielded an imme-
diate phenotypic advantage, which resulted in
modern problem solving ability, but because
its expression played out through learned cul-
tural mechanisms, the ratchet eﬀect initially
allowed for only slow, almost imperceptible
change. Essentially, enhanced WM had little
to work with until cultural knowledge had
accrued more and more components. If the
archaeological record was more complete, we
would see an accelerating rate of culture change
over the course of 150,000 years. Some would
argue that this is precisely what we do see, but
given the limited number of data points such a
conclusion is unwarranted, at least for now.
We ﬁnd the 100,000–150,000 year gap between the ﬁrst
anatomically modern humans, and evidence for EWM to be
troubling, and are unconvinced, thus far, by either solutions
(a) or (b).
(2) Alleles for enhanced WM occurred by mutation
in anatomically modern African population after
200,000 years ago, and probably after 100,000 years
ago. Here the serendipity of archaeological discovery
clouds the chronology. Some evidence—for example,10 International Journal of Evolutionary Biology
the indirect evidence for use of snares at Sibudu
[38]—is as old as 75,000BP. But abundant evidence
for enhanced WM did not appear until about 30,000
year ago. As such, the archaeological record does ﬁt
an “Out of Africa” scenario in which a local southern
or eastern population of modern humans expanded
rapidly out of Africa following the demographic
crash that occurred about 70,000 years ago [6]. It
may well turn out, when the archaeological record
for southern and eastern Africa are more thoroughly
documented, that this version will prevail. But this
is not the only feasible scenario. It is also possible
that the ﬁnal enhancement of WM occurred closer
to 30,000 years BP, and spread rapidly via gene ﬂow
to populations all over the world. The archaeological
evidence for enhanced WM just does not have the
resolutiontoresolvethisspeciﬁcevolutionarypuzzle.
Aﬁnalobservationconcerninghumancognitiveevolutionin
general is appropriate. Evidence for the evolution of working
memoryﬁtsnicelyintoamosaicaccountofhumancognitive
evolution. Some components of modern cognition evolved
long ago. Spatial cognition, for example, was modern by
500,000yearsago[78,79],andevolvedincircumstancesvery
diﬀerentfromthoseofthelast100,000years.Proceduralcog-
nition also has considerable antiquity, with archaic humans
suchasHomoheidelbergensisandNeandertalsdemonstrating
modern procedural abilities [41, 80]. Symbolism, though a
poorly deﬁned cognitive ability, has roots stretching back
perhaps300,000years(pigmentuseatTwinRiversinZambia
[81]). In a very real sense, search for the evolution of
modern cognition is a fool’s game. The components of
modern cognition, like the components of modern anatomy,
evolvedatdiﬀerent times for diﬀerent reasons. True, the ﬁnal
package did not come together until after 100,000 years ago,
with working memory perhaps the ﬁnal piece. But this was
preceded by many other developments equally important to
the modern mind.
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